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A neuronal device for the control of multi-step computations
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We describe the operation of a neuronal device which embodies the computational princi-
ples of the “paper-and-pencil” machine envisioned by Alan Turing. The network is based
on principles of cortical organization. We develop a plausible solution to implement point-
ers and investigate how neuronal circuits may instantiate the basic operations involved in
assigning a value to a variable (i.e., x = 5), in determining whether two variables have the
same value and in retrieving the value of a given variable to be accessible to other nodes of
the network. We exemplify the collective function of the network in simplified arithmetic
and problem solving (blocks-world) tasks.
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I. Introduction
Consider the task of finding a route in a map. You
are likely to start searching the initial and final des-
tinations, identifying possible routes between them,
and then selecting the one you think is shorter or
more appropriate. This simple example highlights
how almost any task we perform is organized in
a sequence of processes involving operations which
we identify as “atomic” (here search, memory and
decision-making). In contrast with the thorough
knowledge of the neurophysiology underlying these
atomic operations [1–3], neuroscience is only start-
ing to shed light on how they organize into pro-
grams [4–6]. Partly due to the difficulty of imple-
menting compound tasks in animal models, sequen-
tial decision-making has mostly been addressed by
the domains of artificial intelligence, cognitive sci-
ence and psychology [7, 8].
Our goal is to go beyond the available neurophys-
iological data to show how the brain might sequen-
tialize operations to conform multi-step cognitive
10 University Paris-Sud, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, F-
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programs. We suppose the existence of elementary
operations akin to Ullman’s [9] routines, although
not limited to the visual domain. Of special rele-
vance to our report is the body of work that has
grown out of the seminal work of John Anderson
[8]. Building on the notion of “production systems”
[10], Anderson and colleagues developed ACT-R as
a framework for human cognition [8]. It consists of
a general mechanism for selecting productions fu-
eled by sensory, motor, goal and memory modules.
The ACT-R framework emphasizes the chained na-
ture of human cognition: at any moment in the exe-
cution of a task, information placed in buffers acts
as data for the central production system, which
feeds-back to these same modules.
Despite vast recent progress in our understanding
of decision formation in simple perceptual tasks [3],
it remains unresolved how the operations required
by cognitive architectures may be implemented at
the level of single neurons. We address some of the
challenges posed by the translation of cognitive ar-
chitectures to neurons: how neuronal circuits might
implement a single operation, how multiple opera-
tions are arranged in a sequence, how the output
of one operation is made available to the next one.
II. Fundamental assumptions and
neuronal implementation
i. The basis for single operations
Insights into the machinery for simple sensory-
motor associations come from studies of monkey
electrophysiology. Studies of oculomotor decisions
—focused primarily on area LIP [12]— have shown
that neurons in this area reflect the accumulation
of evidence leading to a decision [3]. In a well stud-
ied paradigm, monkeys were trained to discrimi-
nate the direction of motion of a patch of moving
dots and report the direction of motion with an
eye-movement response to the target located in the
direction of motion [13]. Neurons in LIP which re-
spond with high levels of activity during memory
saccades to specific portions of space are recorded
during the task. These neurons show ramping ac-
tivity of their firing rates with a slope that de-
pends on the difficulty of the task, controlled by
the proportion of dots that move coherently in one
direction [14]. In a reaction time version of the
task [13], when monkeys are free to make a sac-
cade any time after the onset of the motion stim-
uli, the ramping activity continues until a fixed
level of activity is reached, signaling the impend-
ing saccade (Fig. 1 a). Crucially, the level of this
“threshold” does not depend on the difficulty of
the task or the time to respond. The emerging
picture is that ramping neurons in LIP integrate
sensory evidence and trigger a response when ac-
tivity reaches a threshold. This finding provided
strong support for accumulation or race models of
decision making which have been previously postu-
lated to explain error rates and reaction times in
simple tasks, and match nicely with decision the-
oretical notions of optimality [15]. While experi-
mental studies have mainly characterized the feed-
forward flow of information from sensory to motor
areas, evidence accumulation is also modulated by
contextual and task-related information including
prior knowledge about the likelihood and payoff of
each alternative [16, 17]. Interestingly, a common
currency —the spiking activity of neurons in mo-
tor intention areas— may underlie these seemingly
unequal influences on decision formation.
ii. Sequencing of multiple operations
Brain circuits can integrate sensory evidence over
hundreds of milliseconds. This illustrates how the
brain decides based on unreliable evidence, averag-
ing over time to clean up the noise. Yet the dura-
tion of single accumulation processes is constrained
by its analog character, a problem pointed out ear-
lier by von Neumann in his book The computer and
the Brain [18]: “in the course of long calculations
not only do errors add up but also those committed
early in the calculation are amplified by the latter
parts of it...”. Modern computers avoid the prob-
lem of noise amplification employing digital instead
of analog computation. We have suggested that
the brain may deal with the amplification of noise
by serially chaining individual integration stages,
where the changes made by one ramp-to-threshold
process represent the initial stage for the next one
(Fig. 1 b) [11,19].
Evidence for the ramp-to-threshold dynamics has
been derived from tasks in which the decision re-
flects a commitment to a motor plan [3, 20]. As
others [21], we posit that the ramp-to-threshold
process for action-selection is not restricted to mo-
tor actions, but may also be a mechanism to select
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Figure 1: Diffusion processes in single and multi-step tasks. (a) In simple sensory-motor tasks, response
selection is mediated by the the accumulation of sensory evidence to a response threshold. (b) In
tasks involving multiple steps, there is a parallel competition between a subset of “productions rules”
implemented by pools of neurons that accumulate evidence up to a threshold. The selected production
can have overt effects (motor actions) as well as covert effects in modifying the state of the memory,
after which a new cycle begins. Adapted with permission from Ref. [11].
internal actions like the decision of where to at-
tend, what to store in memory, or what question
to ask next. Therefore, the activation of a circuit
based on sensory and mnemonic evidence is medi-
ated by the accumulation of evidence in areas of
the brain which can activate that specific circuit,
and which compete with other internal and exter-
nal actions. Within a single step, the computation
proceeds in parallel and settles in a choice. Seriality
is the consequence of the competitive selection of
internal and external actions that transforms noisy
and parallel steps of evidence accumulation into a
sequence of discrete changes in the state of the net-
work. These discrete steps clean up the noise and
enable the logical flow of the computation.
Following the terminology of symbolic cognitive
architectures [7, 8], the “ramping” neurons which
select the operation to do next are referred as “pro-
duction” neurons. The competition between pro-
ductions is driven by inputs from sensory and mem-
ory neurons and by the spontaneous activity in
the production network. As in single-step decisions
[13], the race between productions concludes when
neurons encoding one production reach a decision
threshold. The neurons which detect the crossing of
a threshold by a production also mediate its effects,
which is to activate or deactivate other brain cir-
cuits. The activated circuits can be motor, but are
not restricted to it, producing different effects like
changes in the state of working memory (deciding
what to remember), activating and broadcasting in-
formation which was in a “latent” state (like sen-
sory traces and synaptic memories [22,23]), or acti-
vating peripheral processors capable of performing
specific functions (like changing the focus of atten-
tion, segregating a figure from its background, or
tracing a curve).
iii. Pointers
Versatility and flexibility are shared computational
virtues of the human brain and of the Turing ma-
chine. The simple example of addition (at the root
of Turing’s conception) well illustrates what sort
of architecture this requires. One can picture the
addition of two numbers x and y as displacing y
steps from the initial position x. This simple repre-
sentation of addition as a walk in the number line
describes the core connection between movement
in space and mathematical operations. It also de-
scribes the need of operations that use variables
which temporarily bind to values in order to achieve
flexibility.
In this section we describe how neuronal circuits
050006-3
Papers in Physics, vol. 5, art. 050006 (2013) / A. Zylberberg et al.
may instantiate the basic operations involved in as-
signing a value to a variable (i.e., x = 5), in deter-
mining whether two variables have the same value
and in retrieving the value of a given variable. This
is in a way a proof of concept, i.e., a way to con-
struct these operations with neurons. We are of
course in no position to claim that this instantiation
is unique (it is certainly not). However, we have
tried to ground it on important principles of neu-
rophsyiology and we believe that this construction
raises important aspects and limitations which may
generalize to other neuronal constructions of vari-
able assignment, comparison and retrieval mecha-
nisms.
Here we introduce the concept of pointers; in-
dividual or pool of neurons which can temporarily
point to other circuits. When a pointer is active, it
facilitates the activation of the circuit to which it
is temporarily bound and which is dynamically set
during the course of a computation.
A pointer “points” to a cortical territory (for in-
stance, to V1). This cortical mantle represents a
space of values that a given variable may assume.
The cortex is organized in spatial maps represent-
ing features (space, orientation, color, 1-D line...)
and a pointer can temporarily bind to one of these
possible set of values in a way that the activation
of the pointer corresponds to the activation of the
value and hence functions as a variable (i.e., x = 3).
There are many proposed physiological mechanisms
to temporally bind neuronal circuits [24–26]. A
broad class of mechanisms relies on sustained re-
verberant neuronal activity [26]. A different class
relies on small modifications of synaptic activity,
which constitute silent memories in latent connec-
tions [23]. Here we opt for the second alternative,
first because it has a great metabolic advantage al-
lowing to share many memories at very low cost,
and more importantly because it separates the pro-
cesses of variable assignation and variable retrieval.
As we describe below in detail, in this architecture
the current state of the variable is not broadcast to
other areas until it is specifically queried.
To specifically implement the binding with
neuron-like elements, we follow the classic assump-
tion that when two groups of neurons are active at
the same time, a subset of the connection between
them is strengthened (Fig. 2). The strengthening
of the synapses is bidirectional, and it is responsi-
ble for the binding between neuronal populations.
To avoid saturation of the connections and to allow
for new associations to form, the strength of these
connections decays exponentially within a few hun-
dred milliseconds. Specifically, if the connection
strength between a pair of populations is wbase,
then when both populations are active the connec-
tion strength increases exponentially with a time
constant τrise to a maximum connection strength
of wmax. When one or both of the populations be-
come inactive then the connection strength decays
exponentially back to wbase with a time constant of
τdecay.
The mechanism described above generates a
silent coupling between a pointer and the value to
which it points. How is this value recovered? In
other words, how can other elements of the program
know the value of the variable X? The expression
of a value stored in silent synapses is achieved by
simultaneously activating the pointer circuit and
forcing the domain of the variable to a winner-take-
all (WTA) mode (Fig. 2). The WTA mode —set
by having neurons with self-excitation and cross-
inhibition [27]— assures that only one value is re-
trieved at a time. These neurons make stronger
connections with the neurons to which they are
bound than with the other neurons. When the net-
work is set in a WTA mode, these connections bias
the competition to retrieve the value previously as-
sociated with the pointer (Fig. 2). In other words,
activation of the pointer by itself is not sufficient to
drive synaptic activity to the neuron (or neurons)
representing the value to which it points. But it
can bias the activation of a specific neuron when
co-activated with a tonic activation of the entire
network.
This architecture is flexible and economic. Value
neurons only fire when they are set or retrieved.
Memory capacity is constrained by the number of
connections and not by the number of neurons. But
it also has a caveat. Given that only one variable
can be bound to a specific domain at any one time,
multiple bindings must be addressed serially. As
we show later, this can be accomplished by the se-
quential firing of production neurons.
a. Compare the value of two variables
If two variables X and Y bind to instances in the
same domain, it is possible to determine whether
the two variables are bound to the same instance,
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Figure 2: Instantiation of variables through plastic synapses. When two neurons become active, the
connection between them is rapidly strengthened, forming a transient association which decays within
a few hundreds of milliseconds. The value of a pointer can be retrieved by setting the pointer’s domain
in a winner-take-all mode and activating the pointer which biases the WTA competition through its
strengthened connections.
i.e., whether x = y. The mechanics of this process
is very similar to retrieving the value of a variable.
Pointer neurons1 X and Y are co-activated. The
equality in the assignment of X and Y can be iden-
tified by a coincidence detector. Specifically, this is
solved by adjusting the excitability in the value do-
main in such a way that the simultaneous input
on a single value neuron exceeds the threshold but
the input of a single pointer does not. This pro-
posed mechanism is very similar to the circuits in
the brain stem which —based on coincidence de-
tection of delay lines— encode interaural time dif-
ference [28]. This shows the concrete plausibility
of generating such dynamic threshold mechanisms
that act as coincidence detectors.
b. Assign the value of one variable to another
Similarly, to assign the value of X to the variable
Y (Y ← x), the value of the variable that is to
be copied needs to be retrieved as indicated previ-
ously, by activating the variable X and forcing a
WTA competition at the variable’s domain. Then,
the node coding for variable Y must be activated,
which will lead to a reinforcing of the connections
between Y and x which will instantiate the new
association.
1In our framework, a pointer can also be a population of
neurons that functions as a single pointer.
III. Concrete implementation of
neuronal programs
In the previous sections we sketched a set of prin-
ciples by which brain circuits can control multi-
step operations and store temporary information
in memory buffers to share it between different op-
erations.
Here we demonstrate, as a proof of concept, a
neuronal implementation of such circuits in two
simple tasks.
The first one is a simple arithmetic counter,
where the network has to count from an initial num-
ber nini to a final number nend, a task that can be
seen as the emblematic operation of a Turing de-
vice. The second example is a blocks-world prob-
lem, a paradigmatic example of multi-step decision
making in artificial intelligence [29]. The aim of
the first task is to illustrate how the different ele-
ments sketched above act in concert to implement
neuronal programs. The motivation to implement
blocks worlds is to link these ideas to developed
notions of visual routines [9, 30,31].
i. Arithmetic counter
We designed the network to be generic in the sense
of being able to solve any instance of the problem,
i.e., any instantiation of nini and nend. We decided
to implement a counter, since it constitutes essen-
tially a while loop and hence a basic intermediate
description of most flexible computations. In the
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network, each node is meaningful, and all param-
eters were set by hand. Of course, understanding
how these parameters are adjusted through a learn-
ing process is a difficult and important question,
but this is left for future work.
Each number is represented by a pool of neurons
selective to the corresponding numerosity value
[32]. A potential area for the neurons belonging
to the numerosity domain is the Intra Parietal Sul-
cus (IPS) [33], where neurons coding for numeros-
ity have been found in both humans and mon-
keys [34]. In the model, number neurons interact
through random lateral inhibitory connections and
self-excitation. This allows, as described above, to
collapse a broad distribution of number neurons
[32] to a pool representing a single number, in a
retrieval process during a step of the program. We
assume that the newtwork has learned a notion of
number proximity and continuity. This was im-
plemented via a transition-network that has asym-
metrical connections with the number-network. A
given neuron representing the number n excites the
transition neuron n → n + 1 population. This in
turn excites the neuron that represents the num-
ber n+ 1. Again, we do not delve into how this is
learned, we assume it as a consolidated mechanism.
The numbers-network can be in different modes:
it can be quiescent, such that no number is ac-
tive, or it can be in a winner-take-all mode with
only one unit in the active state. Our network
implementation of the counter makes use of two
variables. The Count variable stores the current
count and changes dynamically as the program pro-
gresses, after being initialized to nini. The End
variable stores the number at which the counting
has to stop and is initially set to nend.
The network behaves basically as a while loop,
increasing the value of the Count variable while
its value differs from that of the End variable.
To increment the count, we modeled a transition-
network with units that have asymmetrical connec-
tions with the numbers-network. For example, the
“1 → 2” node receives excitatory input from the
unit coding for number 1 and in turn excites num-
ber 2. This network stores knowledge about succes-
sor functions, and in order to become active it re-
quires additional input from the production system.
As mentioned above, here we do not address how
such structure is learned in number representing
neurons. Learning to count is an effortful process
during childhood [35] by which children learn tran-
sition rules between numbers. We postulate that
these relations are encoded in structures which re-
semble horizontal connections in the cortex [36–38].
In the same way that horizontal connections in-
corporate transition probabilities of oriented ele-
ments in a slow learning process [39, 40], resulting
in a Gestalt as a psychological sense of “natural”
continuity, we argue that horizontal connections
between numerosity neurons can endow the same
sense of transition probability and natural continu-
ity in the space of numbers. The successor function
can be as an homologous to a matrix of horizontal
connections in the array of number neurons.
In a way, our description postulates that a cer-
tain number of operations are embedded in each
domain cortex (orientation selective neurons in V1
for curve tracing, number selective neurons in IPS
for arithmetic...). This can be seen as “compiled”
routines which are instantiated by local horizontal
connections capable of performing operations such
as collinear continuity, or “add one”. The program
can control which of these operations becomes ac-
tive at any given step by gating the set of horizontal
connections, a process we have referred to as “ad-
dressing” the cortex [41]. Just as an example, when
older children learn to automatically count every
three numbers (1, 4, 7, 10, 13...) we postulate that
they have instantiated a new routine (through a
slow learning process) capable of establishing the
transition matrix of n → n + 3. The repertoire of
compiled functions is dynamic and can change with
learning [42].
Counting requires a sequence of operations which
include changes in the current count, retrieval of
successor functions and numeric comparisons. The
successive steps of the counting routine are gov-
erned by firing of production neurons. The order
in which the productions fire is controlled by the
content of the memory (Fig. 3). We emphasize
that while the production selection process pro-
ceeds in parallel —as each production neuron con-
stantly evaluates its input— the selected produc-
tion strongly inhibits the other production neurons
and therefore the evidence accumulated at one step
is for the most part lost after a production is se-
lected.2 In Fig. 3 we simulate a network that has
2In the absence of external noise (as in the present sim-
ulations), only the production with the largest input has
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Figure 3: Sketch of the network implementing an arithmetic counter. (a) The network is divided into
five sub-networks: productions, memory, pointers (or variables), numbers, and transition-networks. The
order in which the productions fire is controlled by the state of the memory network, which is itself
controlled by the production system. (b) Dynamics of a subset of neurons in the network. All units are
binary except for the production neurons (violet) which gradually accumulate evidence to a threshold.
to count from numbers 2 to 6. Once the initial
and final numbers have been bound to the Count
and End variables respectively, the network cycles
through six productions. The first production that
is selected is the PrepareNext production, whose
role is to retrieve the value that results from adding
1 to the current count. To this end, this production
retrieves the current value of the Count variable,
and excites the neurons of the transition-network
such that the node receiving an input from the re-
trieved value of Count becomes active (i.e., if 2
is active in the numbers-network, then 2 → 3 be-
comes active in the transition-network). To assure
that the retrieved value is remembered for the next
step (the actual change of the current count), neu-
rons in the transition-network are endowed with
recurrent excitation, and therefore these neurons
remain active until explicitly inhibited. The same
production also activates a node in the memory-
network which excites the IncrementCount produc-
tion, which is therefore selected next. The role of
the next production (IncrementCount) is to actu-
ally update the current count, changing the binding
of the Count variable. The IncrementCount pro-
duction inhibits all neurons in the number network,
to turn it to the quiescent state. Once the net-
work is quiescent, lateral inhibition between num-
ber nodes is released and the asymmetrical inputs
from the transition-network can activate the num-
ber to which it projects. At the same time, the In-
crementCount production activates the Count vari-
higher-than-baseline activity.
able, which is then bound to the currently active
node in the numbers-network. Notice that this
two-step process between the PrepareNext and In-
crementCount productions basically re-assigns the
value of the Count variable from its initial value
n to a new value n + 1. Using a single produc-
tion to replace these two (as tried in earlier versions
of the simulations) required activating the number
and transition neurons at the same time which lead
to fast and uncontrolled transitions in the numbers-
network. To increase the current count in a con-
trolled manner, we settled for the two-productions
solution. The IncrementCount production also ac-
tivates a memory unit that biases the competition
at the next stage, in favor of the ClearNext pro-
duction. This production shuts up the activity in
the transition-network, strongly inhibiting its neu-
rons to compensate for their recurrent excitation.
Shutting the activity of these neurons is required
at the next step of the routine to avoid changes
in the current count when the Count variable is
retrieved to be compared with the End variable.
After ClearNext, the RetrieveEnd production fires
which retrieves the value of the End variable to
strengthen the connections between the End vari-
able and the value to which it is bound. This step
is required since the strength of the plastic connec-
tions decays rapidly, and therefore the instantiation
of the variables will be lost if not used or reactivated
periodically. Finally, the CheckEqual production
is selected to determine if the Count and End vari-
ables are equal. If both variables are equal, a node
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in the memory network is activated which is de-
tected by the Halt production to indicate that the
task has been completed; otherwise, the production
that is selected next is the PrepareNext production
and the production cycle is repeated. In Fig. 3b,
we show the dynamics of a subset of neurons for a
network that has to count from 2 to 6.
With this example we have shown how even a
seemingly very easy task such as counting (which
can be encoded in up to two lines in virtually any
programming language) seems to require a com-
plex set of procedures to coordinate and stabilize
all computations, when they are performed by neu-
ronal circuits with slow building of activity and
temporal decay.
ii. A world of blocks
A natural extension of the numerotopic domain
used in the above example is to incorporate prob-
lems in which the actor must interact with its envi-
ronment, and sensory and motor productions ought
to be coordinated.
The visual system performs a great variety of
computations. It can encode a large set of visual
features in a parallel feed-forward manner forming
its base representation [9,30,43,44], and temporally
store these features in a distributed manner [45–47].
A matrix of lateral connections gated by top-down
processing can further detect conjunctions of these
feature for object recognition.
In analogy with motor routines, the visual sys-
tem relies on serial chaining of elemental operation
[9, 31] to gain computational flexibility. There are
many proposals as to which operations are elemen-
tal [31], but, as we have discussed above, this list
may be fuzzy since the set of elementary operations
may be changed by learning [41]. In this frame-
work, atomic operations are those that are encoded
in value domains.
Here, and for the purpose of implementing a neu-
ral circuit capable of solving the blocks worlds, we
will focus on a simplified group of three elemental
operations:
Visual search: the capacity of the system to iden-
tify the location of a given feature.
Visual cuing: the capacity of the system of high-
lighting the features that are present at a given
location.
Early Visual
Layer
Color Position
Search Cuing
Figure 4: Simplified model of the visual system
used in the blocks-world simulations. The upper
portion shows the different layers and their connec-
tions. The early visual area is formed by a first sen-
sory layer of neurons that receive stimulation from
the outer world and a second attentional layer with
bidirectional connections between the higher color
or position tuned areas. The grayed neurons are
the ones that present a higher activity. The lower
panels show an example of the cuing and search
operations. In the latter, a color tuned neuron is
stimulated and drives an activity increase in the
early visual layer. That later empowers the activ-
ity in the position layer concluding the search. The
right situation shows the similar cuing operation.
Shift the processing focus: a method guided
by attention to focus the processing of visual
features or other computations in a given lo-
cation.
Here we use a simplified representation of the vi-
sual system based on previous studies [48–50]. We
assume a hierarchy of two layers of neurons. The
first one is tuned to conjunctions of colors and lo-
cations in the visual field. The second one has two
distinct groups of populations, one with neurons
that have large receptive fields that encode color
irrespective of their location and another which en-
codes location independently of color (Fig. 4). The
model assumes that neurons in the first layer tuned
to a particular color and retinotopic location are
reciprocally connected to second layer units that
encode the same color or location.
This architecture performs visual search of color
in a way which resembles the variable assignation
described above, through a conjunction mechanism
between maps encoding different features. In the
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Visual system
Sensory
Layer
Attentional
layer
Memory state
Production system
Variables
Forcing
Neurons
Color
Position
layer
Goal
Conﬁguration
Game state
Figure 5: Sketch of the network that solves the
blocks-world problem. The sensory early visual
system receives input from the BW configuration
and excites the first attentional layer. The latter
is connected to color and position specific areas.
The arrows show there is a connection between lay-
ers. The individual connections may be excitatory
or inhibitory. The connections with the inverted
triangle head indicate only excitatory connections
exist.
model, the color cortex encodes each color redun-
dantly for all positions forming a set of spatial vec-
tors (one for each color). Of course, all these spatial
maps selective for a given color can be intermingled
in the cortex, as it is also the case with orienta-
tion columns which sample all orientations filling
space in small receptive fields. If, for instance, a
red square is presented in position three, the neu-
ron selective for red (henceforth referred to as in
the red map) and with a receptive field in posi-
tion three will fire. This activation, in turn, prop-
agates to spatial neurons (which are insensitive to
color). Thus, if four squares of different colors are
presented in positions 1 to 4, the spatial neurons in
these positions will fire at the same rate. To search
for the spatial position of a red block, the activity
of neurons coding for red in the color map must
be enhanced. The enhanced activity propagates
to the early visual areas which code for conjunc-
tions of color and space, which in turn propagates
to the spatial map, highlighting the position where
the searched color was present. Spatial selection
is triggered by an attention layer which selects the
production “attend to red”, addressing the sensory
cortex in a way that only locations containing red
features will be routed to the spatial neurons. The
color of a block at one location can be retrieved
by an almost identical mechanism. In this case,
the production system sets the attentional network
to a given position in space and through conjunc-
tion mechanisms (because connections are recipro-
cal) only the color in the selected position is re-
trieved. This is a simple device for searching based
on the propagation of attentional signals which has
been used before in several models (e.g., Ref. [31])
(Fig. 4).
To bridge these ideas which are well grounded
in the visual literature [30, 31, 43] with notions of
planning and sequential mental programs, we use
this model to implement a solver for a simple set of
Blocks-World problems. The blocks-world frame-
work is a paradigmatic artificial intelligence prob-
lem that consists of a series of colored blocks piled
up on top of a large surface in many columns. The
goal is to arrange the blocks according to their color
in a given goal configuration. The player can only
move one block from the top of any column and
place it at the top of another, or on the surface that
supports all the blocks. We choose to construct a
solver for a restricted blocks-world problem where
the surface can only hold 3 columns of blocks and
the goal configuration is to arrange them all into
one column (that we call the target column).3
We implement a network with a set of memory
and production neurons —analogous to the counter
circuit described above— which coordinates a set
of visual and motor productions (Fig. 5). The in-
teraction between the memory layer and the pro-
duction system triggers the execution of elemental
visual processes, motor actions and changes in the
memory configuration in order to solve any given
instance of the problem.
To solve this problem, an algorithm needs to be
able to find whether a block is in the correct posi-
tion. For this, it requires, first, a “retrieve color”
from a given location function. Normally the lo-
cation that is intended to be cued is the one that
is being attended to. We implement the attended
location as a variable population (that we call the
processing focus or PF inspired in Ullman’s work
[9]), so the “retrieve color” is equal to cue the color
in PF ’s location.4 Second, it must compare the col-
ors in different locations. This can be done by bind-
3This restricted problem is equivalent to the Tower of
London game [51].
4There are works that name PF as Deictic Pointers and
suggest that it would be possible to store it also by keeping
gaze or even a finger at the relevant location [52].
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Figure 6: Mean firing rate of a subset of neuronal populations involved in the resolution of an instance of
BW. The rate is normalized between 0 (white) and 1 (black). The horizontal axis represents the ellapsed
time in arbitrary units. At the bottom, we show a subset of intermediate BW configurations, aligned to
the execution time of the motor commands which lead to these configurations.
ing the relevant location colors to separate variables
and then comparing them in the way described in
section a.
As the goal is to pile all the blocks in the correct
order in a given target column, a possible first step
towards the goal is to compare the target column
with the goal configuration from the bottom to the
top. This can be done by chaining several move-
ments of the processing focus with color retrievals
and subsequent comparisons. Once the first dif-
ference is found, the target column’s upper blocks
must be moved away in order to replace the differ-
ent colored block with the correct one. This pro-
cess is carried out using several motor productions.
Once the target column is free to receive the cor-
rect colored block, that color must be searched in
the remaining columns. This is done as described
earlier in this section. Once found, the PF can be
moved there in order to view if there are blocks
above it. If there are, motor productions must be
chained in order to free the desired block and move
it to the target column. After this is done, the pro-
gram can loop back to comparing the target column
with the goal configuration and iteratively solve the
problem.
Our neuronal implementation chains the produc-
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tions in a similar way as the one described above
and elicits a complex activity pattern (Fig. 6). A
detailed explanation of the implementation can be
found in the supplementary material [53].
IV. Conclusions
Here we presented ideas aimed to bridge the gap be-
tween the neurophysiology of simple decisions and
the control of sequential operations. Our frame-
work proposes a specific set of mechanisms by
which multi-step computations can be controlled by
neural circuits. Action selection is determined by
a parallel competition amongst competing neurons
which slowly accumulate sensory and mnemonic ev-
idence until a threshold. Actions are conceived in a
broad sense, as they can result in the activation of
motor circuits or other brain circuits not directly
involved in a movement of the eyes or the limbs.
Thresholding the action of the productions results
in discrete changes to a meta-stable network. These
discrete steps clean up the noise and enable a logi-
cal flow of the computation.
Comprehending the electrophysiological mecha-
nisms of seriality is hindered by the intrinsic diffi-
culty of training non-human primates in complex
multi-step tasks. The ideas presented in this re-
port may serve to guide the experimental search for
the mechanisms required to perform tasks involv-
ing multiple steps. Neurons integrating evidence
towards a threshold should be observed even in the
absence of an overt response, for instance in the
frontal-eye fields of awake monkeys for the control
of attention. Memory neurons should show fast
transitions between metastable states, on average
every ∼ 100-250 msec, compatible with the mean
time between successive productions in ACT-R [8].
As mentioned, we do not address how the pro-
ductions and the order in which they are executed
are learned. There is a vast literature, for instance
in reinforcement learning [54–56] describing how to
learn the sequence of actions required to solve a
task. Deahene & Changeaux [57] showed how a
neuronal network can solve a task similar to the
BW that we modelled here, but where the order in
which productions fire was controlled by the dis-
tance from the game state to the goal. Instead,
our aim here was to investigate how the algorithm
(the pseudo-code) may be implemented in neuronal
circuits —once it has already been learned— from
a small set of generic principles. The operation of
the proposed neuronal device in a simple arithmetic
task and in a neuronal network capable of solving
any instance of a restricted Blocks-World domain
illustrates the plausibility of our framework for the
control of computations involving multiple steps.
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